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Introduction
The concept of human dignity has been incorporated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) since 1948 as the basis of fundamental human rights. In the preamble
of the UDHR, it was emphasized that dignity is the foundation of freedom, and it was stated
clearly that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”1
The word Dignity is derived from ‘dignitas’ or “worthiness” in Latin.2 Almost
everyone agrees that they should be treated and treat others in a dignified manner; however,
people have different views about dignity and what gives people honour and worth. There are
different philosophical ideas about the meaning of this concept and its conditions; is it an
inherent feature of all human beings? or is it grounded on different values throughout history?
The concept of human dignity has been a fundamental yet controversial area in the field of
bioethics, especially with the ongoing debate over euthanasia or “death with dignity”.3
Euthanasia is a Greek term which means “good” (eu) “death” (thanatos), and it has
been subjected to debate since its inception. Euthanasia is the hastening of death to prevent or
terminate the suffering of a patient with a terminal or incurable illness. There are two types of
euthanasia: Active and passive. Active euthanasia is a deliberate act of the physician, usually
by the administration of a lethal drug; active euthanasia is further categorized into: voluntary
(upon patient request), non-voluntary (without consent of the patient), and involuntary
(patient is unable to give consent). Passive euthanasia is withholding or withdrawing lifemaintaining treatment.4 From a legal standpoint, passive euthanasia is accepted in most

1

UN General Assembly, ”Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” preamble (Paris, 1948),
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
2
P Deepa, "Individual Dignity and Euthanasia: An Ethical Perspective," Global Bioethics Enquiry 8, no 1 (2020):
47.
3
Manuel Toscano, "Human Dignity as High Moral Status," Les ateliers de l'éthique 6, no 2 (2011): 4-25.
4
D V K Chao et al., "Euthanasia revisited," Family Practice 19 (2002): 128-34.

3

countries worldwide, while active euthanasia is still subject to debate. Active voluntary
euthanasia is illegal and is treated as a crime in most countries, while active involuntary
euthanasia is legalized in some countries, such as Switzerland (which is known for death
tourism; it is the practice of travelling to the country to commit suicide or assisted suicide)
and Washington State in the United States of America.5
Opponents of euthanasia claim that killing a patient is an immoral act because it
suggests that the person’s life has lost all meaning and value, and this is fundamentally
against human dignity.6 According to opponents, dignity is not subjective, and the patient
ought not to decide that his life is deprived of dignity, and therefore make the decision to end
it. On the other hand, proponents of euthanasia claim that disabling diseases humiliate human
beings, and in such case maintaining biological life against the will of the patient is arguably
immoral and an act against human dignity; to respect human dignity is to respect what it
means to be a human being and to respect his free choice.7
To be able to take a position in this debate, some questions should be answered. What
is meant by human dignity? Is dignity conditioned? If so, what are the conditions? Is it taken
away from the person under certain conditions? Or, is it unquestionably ascribed to every
person? Then, another important question to be answered is whether severe disability and
terminal illness deprive the patient of his dignity, and the last question is about the moral
permissibility of voluntary euthanasia and how it aligns with or violates human dignity.
The main objective of the current thesis is to evaluate different philosophical theories
about human dignity and how they are applied in our understanding of voluntary euthanasia.
My first claim is that dignity is not dependent on intrinsic or extrinsic values; it is not lost or

5

Nargus Ebrahimi, "The ethics of euthanasia," Australian Medical Student Journal 3 (2012): 73-75.
Daniel P Sulmasy, "Death and Human Dignity," The Linacre Quarterly 61, no 4 (1994): 7.
7
Deepa, "Individual Dignity,” 46.
6
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gained. Rather, it is an inherent feature of all human beings by virtue of being human beings.
In my endeavour to proceed in this argument, I am going to present a detailed history of this
concept in the first chapter, and how it developed throughout history, from being tied to the
individual as being a member of a certain social class, to becoming an inherent feature of all
human beings. I will present and evaluate classical and contemporary thoughts.
Since disability is a unique experience, patients’ understanding of their disability and
its relationship to their sense of dignity should be discussed from the first person experience.
In the second chapter, I will discuss the phenomenology of illness and suffering. I will also
present perspectives of some patients with terminal and disabling illnesses and how they
perceive disabling illness to impact their self-image and sense of dignity.
Then, my second claim is that active euthanasia, although it is an exercise of human’s
freedom, it also violates human dignity. I will present different philosophical thoughts about
suicide and active euthanasia and I will evaluate them in relation to human dignity.

5

Chapter 1: Human dignity
1.1 Classical philosophical views
Historically, the word dignity is derived from the Latin term “dignitas hominis” which
meant “status” in classical Roman society. In ancient times, the concept of dignity referred to
the respect and worthiness of an individual with high social status and office rank8. This
aristocratic interpretation of the concept was seen in ancient Rome. At that time, there was a
distinction between classes, entailing that, only those who had high social and political rank
had dignitas, which could be gained or lost. For example, Plato’s Socrates in The Republic
draws a distinction between Greeks and barbarians, maintaining that it is natural that
barbarians are subjected to violence because they lack certain moral protection as they are
slaves by nature.9 In the same vein, Aristotle made a distinction between slaves and free
men.10 11 There was also a distinction between men and women; men only could possess
dignitas.12 In the late Empire, there was the Notita Dignitatum which was a list of the highest
offices granted by the emperor, and this sense of dignity did not presuppose excellence or
being worthy.13 Therefore, the traditional conception of dignity involves expression of a
relation. Stratification of the society and humiliation of individuals from lower social status
were the main reasons for adopting different conceptions of dignity.

8

Hubert Cancik, “’Dignity of Man’ and ‘Persona’ in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De Officiis I
105 – 107,” in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, ed. David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 19-39.
9
Plato, Republic, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Trans. Shorey and ed. Hamilton and Cairns, (New York:
Random House, 1961), 470-c.
10
Aristotle, Aristotle’s Politics, ed. Benjamin Jowett and H.W Carless Davis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920),
1.5, 1254b21-23 and 1.13, 1260a12-13.
11
John F Crosby , "Extending respect to all human beings: A personalist account," Journal of East-West Thought
(2005): 57-66.
12
Leslie Meltzer Henry, "The jurisprudence of dignity," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, [S.l.] 160 (2011):
169-233.
13
Nui Maynooth, “An Assessment of the Notita Dignitatum as a Historical Source for the Late Roman
Bureacracy: The Nature of The Notita Dignitatum,”PhD dissertation (National University of Ireland, 2013), 11.

6

1.1.1 Stoics - Cicero
The Stoics, and especially Cicero, changed this concept, arguing that it should not
depend on social rank or any other factor. Cicero was the one who used the term dignitas to
indicate the elevated rank of human beings in the universe.14 He universalized this concept to
refer to all human beings without referring to special political rank or social status; all human
beings deserve an elevated rank in nature.
In his book De officiis, he wrote that reason is what distinguishes between human
beings and animals and makes them superior, and because of this superiority, human beings
should not behave like animals and seek sensual pleasure. For Cicero, superiority comes
when man lowers his desires and is guided by reason.15 Cicero concluded that, if caught in
pursuing their pleasure, human beings should be ashamed because they behave like animals.
He argued that sensual pleasure is “quite unworthy of the dignity of man . . . And if we will
only bear in mind the superiority and dignity (excellentia et dignitas) of our nature, we shall
realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury.”16 Therefore,
human beings according to Cicero are elevated in nature (having dignity) in the virtue of
possessing reason. Therefore, human beings have the duty to act in a way worthy of their
dignity.
1.1.2 Medieval Thinkers

14

Oliver Sensen, “Human dignity in historical perspective: The contemporary and traditional paradigms,”
European Journal of Political Theory 10, no 1(2011): 76.
15
Cicero, «De Officiis, » trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), 105-107.
16
Ibid., 106.
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With the spread of Christianity, all individual variations were pushed aside. There
became no distinction between individuals based on their gender, ethnic, or social status; only
he who did not violate divine law and loved his neighbour had worthiness in God’s eyes.17
Thomas Aquinas had a clearer conception of human dignity. Aquinas suggested that a
person should be identified with the possession of dignity.18 He also claimed that this dignity
is inalienable and intrinsic to the person. However, he argued that a person could lose his
dignity by committing sins and deviating from the rational order.
1.1.3 Renaissance Humanism
Renaissance humanism came to emphasize the value of all human beings and to
oppose scholasticism. The concept of human dignity continued to develop and was a
fundamental philosophical topic during the renaissance. In his treatise On the dignity and
superiority of man, Gianozzo Manetti emphasized human dignity as the foundation of
civilization.19 The dignity of man, which is granted by God, is realized in his power over the
world and nature.20
Freedom was central in the philosophy of Pico della Mirandola and Leon Battista
Alberti. Mirandola underscored the freedom of all human beings in the Oration on the
Dignity of Man and argued that the human being is particular and has a special dignity. For
Mirandola, man is free to decide; he had the power to grow and continue his own creation
through his actions. That is to say that man is the co-creator of himself and completes God’s
work. It is up to man to become like God (if he strives for high moral principles) or an animal

17

Timophei Balabanov , “The idea of human dignity in western philosophy and culture,” SHS web of
conferences 72 (2019): 2.
18
Mette Lebech, On the Problem of Human Dignity: A Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Investigation,
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009), 76.
19
Balabanov, “human dignity in western philosophy,” 3
20
Ibid.
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(if he pursues his desires); it is his determination and aspiration that uncover his essence.21
Alberti indicated that dignity is actualized in the presence of a respectable occupation which
benefits all citizens and leads to public recognition; thus, he glorified work and condemned
illness.22
While Lorenzo Valla claimed that moral principles such as dignity are empty words,
and declared that satisfying sensual pleasure is the goal and the reward for virtues,23 which
contradicts Cicero’s concept of dignity that was stated earlier, Poggio Barcciolini, the
Florentine humanist emphasized the term dignity and insisted that dignity is not dependent on
the external environment of the person, but rather on his good deeds for his neighbours, and
his merits.24
1.1.4 Modernity
Thomas Hobbes maintained that the dignity of the person depends on his social worth,
or "the public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that
which men commonly call dignity."25 According to this conception of human dignity, a
patient with severe disability who does not contribute economically to the well-being of his
society does not have dignity.
Dignity in Kant’s philosophy
In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant, the German idealist, revolutionized the
concept of dignity. Human dignity is central in Kant’s moral philosophy, and his ideas about

21

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, “Oration on the dignity of man,” in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed.
Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1950),
13-20.
22
L.M. Bragin, Italian humanism. Ethical teachings of the XIV-XV centuries (Moscow: Visshaya shkola, 1977),
184.
23
Ibid., 137.
24
Bragin, Italian humanism, 157.
25
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 63.
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this concept have been subjected to different interpretations. In his well-known work The
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), he argued that the fundamental principle
of moral duties is the categorical imperative (CI), which is an objective, rationally necessary,
non-instrumental and unconditional principle that we ought to follow despite any other
inclinations. Kant also argued that conformity to the CI is essential to rational agency. One of
the formulations of the CI is the humanity formula which states that we should always treat
humanity in ourselves or in others as an end in itself. The Humanity Formulation of the CI
maintains that all free rational beings are owed respect and should be treated “never merely
as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”26 Later in the same book, he said that the
ultimate moral principle may be understood as saying: rational beings have inherent worth,
which is dignity, because they are free rational beings, who are able to make free decisions by
reason. And since moral law is grounded on reason, rational beings are moral agents who
embody the moral law itself.
Kant described dignity as “infinitely above all price, with which it cannot be brought
into reckoning or comparison without, as it were, a profanation of its sanctity.”27 For Kant,
dignity is an inherent feature of all moral agents, and this makes rational beings ends in
themselves, such that they deserve to be treated with dignity.28 Although this Kantian
conception of dignity was claimed to be an inspiration for contemporary philosophers, it is
not flawless. Kant grounded dignity on rationality, therefore, it is possessed only by rational
human beings. This implies that other non-rational human beings such as infants and patients
with cognitive impairment lack dignity.

26

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H J Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1983),
429.
27
Ibid., 96.
28
Marcio Staffen and Mher Arshakyan, “About the Principle of Dignity: philosophical foundations and Legal
Aspects,” Seqüência (Florianópolis) 75 (2017): 43-62.
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1.2 Contemporary philosophical views
From the previous section, we saw that classical philosophical views share the same
conception of human dignity. In classical thought, dignity is either grounded on social status,
freedom or reason; humans are superior to animals by virtue of reason or freedom (initial
dignity), and morality is linked to the duty to realize this initial dignity. However, in the
contemporary thought of dignity, human dignity is viewed as an objective and intrinsic value
of all human beings; it is a “ morally relevant value, one which evidently imposes on us a
moral call and an obligation to respect it.”29
1.2.1 Human Dignity in Phenomenology
Phenomenology is the discipline that studies structures of experience as experienced
from the first-person perspective. Intentionality is what characterizes experience.
Phenomenology was introduced in the early twentieth century in the works of Husserl,
Heidegger, and others. What makes phenomenology distinctive from traditional philosophy is
the recognition of the human being and focussing on the conscious experience from the first
person perspective, and, as Levinas maintained, “no one combated the dehumanization of the
Real better than Husserl [the father of phenomenology].”30
Emmanuel Levinas
Levinas viewed the human person as a being always existing in the mode of concrete
humanity, and his humanity is unique and not to be confounded with another person’s
humanity. It is subjectivity or interiority that is fundamental to persons and is not common to
others, and as he writes “We have always known that it is impossible to form an idea of the

29

Josef Seifert, What is Life? (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), 97.
Emmanuel Levinas, “The Permanent and the Human in Husserl,” in Discovering Existence with
Husserl, trans. and ed. Richard A Cohen and Michael B Smith (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
1998), 131-32.
30
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human totality, for men have an inner life closed to him who does, however, grasp the
comprehensive movements of human groups.”31 Opposite to Kant, Levinas argued that
human dignity is not justified by reason, and reason by itself is not sufficient to qualify
persons to be members in the human family with its entailed rights and duties. Human dignity
is also the sense of duty, compassion, and sympathy.
In phenomenology, the meaning of something arises from concrete dealing with the
world, and is not given through abstract theoretical knowledge. But, how could dignity be
intuited in experience rather than being inferred? How does a person present himself to others
as being worthy of recognition and respect, possessing certain rights, and having certain
duties and obligations? In his phenomenological ethics, Levinas proposed that human dignity
and right are grounded in the relationship with “the Other/ Autrui”. Levinas suggested that
dignity and rights are attributes that all persons have, and they present themselves to others in
the immediate encounter, which he called “the face-to-face”. This requires adopting the firstperson perspective of the one who stands within this face to face encounter with another
person, rather than adopting a neutral third person position, the one who stands outside the
encounter looking in. This goes hand in hand with Levinas’ theory of responsibility for others
that states that ‘the Rights of Man are originally the rights of the other man’. The fundamental
recognition of the dignity of the Other is the recognition that he has a face.32
1.2.2 Human Dignity in Personalism
The term “person” comes from persona, the Latin word, which originated in Greek
drama, where the mask or πρόσωπον, was identified with the role played by an actor in a
play. Personalism had been developed as a reaction to perceived depersonalization in

31

Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University
Press, 1969), 58.
32
Emmanual Levinas, “The Rights of the Other Man”, in Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B Smith
(London: Athlone Press, 1999), 149.
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idealism. This philosophical doctrine originated in the writings of Max Scheler and other
philosophers who have been influenced by Scheler’s writings. Personalism has more than one
doctrine and school which altogether emphasize the subjectivity and centrality of the person.
Personalism is a major movement that affirms the centrality of the person in
philosophical discourse, and defines a person through his dignity. Personalists posit ultimate
value in personhood, and they emphasize the uniqueness and inviolability of the person. It is
Personhood that carries human dignity that deserves unconditional respect. The dignity of the
person as well as his status and experience are regarded by many personalists as the starting
point for philosophical analysis. Personalists like John Crosby argued that respect should be
extended to all persons unconditionally; contrary to Kant, Crosby maintained that rationality
is not the source of human dignity.33 It is also not convincing to say that human dignity
consists of a certain characteristic that may be present or absent in some of us, or that it is
present in excess in some persons by comparison with others.34 According to personalists,
dignity is an absolute intrinsic value of the person.35 Therefore, personalists agree on the
uniqueness of the person among other beings, and for personalists, human dignity does not
depend on other variables such as social status or intelligence.
Max Scheler
The concept of the person in Scheler’s philosophy is complex. Scheler rejected Kant’s
notion of human beings as rational beings; man is ens amans before being “an ens cogitans or
an ens volens.”36 In his book Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values Scheler

33

John F Crosby , "Extending respect to all human beings: A personalist account." Journal of East-West Thought
(2005): 57-66.
34
Peter Baumann, "Persons, Human Beings, and Respect," Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2007): 5-17.
35
Davide Mazzon, "Dignity at the end of life: ethical and deontologic reflections,” Recenti Progressi in Medicina
106, no12 (2015): 593-596.
36
Max Scheler, “Ordo amoris,” in M. Scheler, Schriften aus dem Nachlass (Berlin: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1933),
238.
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argued that formal ethics leads to a depersonalization of the human being. He agreed with
Kant on the understanding of person as an end in itself and as an absolute value; however, he
disagreed with Kant who grounded the person’s absolute value on rationalistic grounds.
Scheler tried to find a new phenomenological grounding or basis for the person and his
dignity rather than a rationalistic basis. There is a relationship between personhood and
actions, and action “belongs to the essence of the person that he only exists and lives in the
performance of intentional acts.”37 The person, for Scheler, is an act-accomplishing being.
The person is the unity of acts, and he is present in every act; however, he is not reducible to
one single act, and the ground of human dignity is the person’s absolute value as a person
through the act of loving and by the way he brings meaning to the world. For Scheler, a
person’s actions, and therefore his moral worth, are determined by the spectrum of what he
loves. This is what Scheler called the ordo amoris, which is the essence of the person,38 and
“whoever grasps the ordo amoris of a man, has hold of man himself.”39 Scheler proposed that
love is a dynamic force of the person, rather than an emotion; it motivates the person to
pursue good deeds rather than evil deeds. Therefore, the person is the unity of his acts, and he
is not a static thing, rather, he is in a continuous modification and determination by these
acts.40
However, a question arises about the personhood of patients in coma: do they cease to
be persons, is self-awareness (potential or actual) a necessary condition for personhood? How
is this concept related to embodiment? All these questions reflect the complexity of the

37

Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik (Bern/München: Francke Verlag,
1966), 389.
38
Heinz Leonardy, Liebe und Person: Max Schelers Versuch eines „Phänomenologischen„ Personalismus (Den
Haag: Martinus Nijhof, 1976), 145.
39
Manfred S Frings, “The Ordo Amoris in Max Scheler,” In Facets of Eros, ed. F J Smith and Erling Eng (Springer,
Dordrecht, 1972), 40-60.
40
Ron Perrin, Max Scheler’s Concept of the Person: An Ethics of Humanism (Houndmills/London: MacMillan,
1991), 90-91.
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concept of personhood. I would argue that personhood is defined in terms of consciousness
and, as Charles Taylor put it, “our experience is necessarily that of embodied agents.”41
1.3 Chapter discussion
In this chapter, I showed the evolution of the concept of human dignity historically,
and the development in its basis from being tied to external factors and certain qualities, to
become an inherent feature of human beings. The idea of dignity is very ancient, and it was
used to express the high social class of an individual. Later on, this concept gained moral
relevance. The evolution of the concept throughout history could be attributed to an increased
recognition of the worthiness of the individual. I traced the development of the concept of
human dignity from the ancient world, in which dignity was a status that was gained or lost
regardless of the worthiness of the individual; the term was then developed by the Stoics,
especially Cicero, to become a feature shared by all rational human beings. Thomas Aquinas
suggested dignity is intrinsic to the person and the only way to lose it is committing sins. The
humanistic approach generally glorified freedom and the work for the benefit of the entire
society. This approach looked at the social worth of the person rather than his inner worth,
which means that physically disabled persons lack dignity.
A significant development of the concept took place in modernity, especially in
Kant’s philosophy, in which dignity was understood as an absolute value of all rational
beings and not dependent on external qualities. Many scholars believed that dignity for Kant
is the absolute inner worth of all human beings; however, I would argue that Kant’s
conception of dignity discriminates between human beings as it grounds dignity on reason
and moral agency. When we reflect on what makes us possess dignity according to Kant, we
find that it is not our humanity or contingent properties, but rather, it is our rational nature

41

Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 25.
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and moral capacities and dispositions. Therefore, dignity could not be regarded as a universal
trait shared by all human beings; rather, it is coupled with reason and the ability of the human
being to be a rational moral agent. What if this human being lacks reason and ceases to be a
moral agent, as in cases of dementia or severe cognitive disabilities for example? Does such
illness deprive patients of their dignity? I would argue that Kant’s position is not capable of
providing a broad definition of human dignity as it deprives non-rational human beings (such
as mentally disabled persons) of dignity. This problem was overcome in contemporary
thought through the significant development of the concept of human dignity, especially in
phenomenology and personalism, which rejected the Kantian notion of dignity being rooted
in rationality and broadened the concept of dignity to be shared by all persons regardless of
their qualities.
As I showed, there is a clear difference between classical and contemporary
philosophical thought. In classical thought, human dignity referred to the unique and elevated
position of the human being in the universe, which was not rooted in his inherent value as a
human being, but rather in the possession of certain capacities such as freedom or reason.
Therefore, the term ‘dignity’ referred to a relative status.42 This could have originated from
the Roman dignitas according to which the person possesses high rank in the society by his
wealth or merit. In phenomenology and personalism, however, dignity became an inherent
feature of all human beings without being rooted in certain inner or outer qualities. It is also
clear that dignity in classical thought yielded duties; there was an emphasis on duties, and the
presence of freedom or reason yielded the duty to make proper use of them. For example,
Kant put the duty of abiding by categorical imperatives before right. In contemporary
thought, the human being has rights because of his absolute value.43

42
43

Sensen, “Human dignity,” 83.
Ibid., 84.
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To conclude, as the worthiness of the person increased throughout history, the concept
of dignity gained special recognition, being an intrinsic feature that cannot be lost or gained.
Therefore, physical or cognitive disability should not be recognized as a violation to one’s
dignity. In the second chapter, I am going to discuss the concept of dignity from the
perspective of ill patients. First, I will discuss the phenomenology of illness and suffering,
then will present some studies about dignity as perceived by ill persons.

17

Chapter 2: Dignity of ill persons
2.1 phenomenology of illness
The body is, as Merleau-Ponty put it, “our expression in the world, the visible form of
our intentions.” 44 The body has unique qualities and it is what provides us with meaning.
This takes us to the concept of embodied existence. Embodiment for Merleau-Ponty is an
essential feature of human existence. Existing as a human being is more complex than just
exerting mere biological functions. Man is understood as an embodied sense giver. The
reason for paying attention to the concept of embodiment is the widespread preoccupation
with the body and increasing a sense of body dissatisfaction in the modern world. Edmund
Husserl distinguished between two bodies which are naturally aligned and united. The
Körper, which is the living, objective body, the flesh; it is the object which is subjected to
intervention by surgeons and technological tools. And the Leib, which is the body as lived; it
is the first person experience of the physical body.45 In case of illness, the body becomes
alien when it is altered or affected by the illness; there is a separation between the Leib and
the Körper, which leads to the emergence of the experience of the duality of the embodied
nature.46
The concept of illness is different from disease. Illness is the self-reported physical or
psychological symptoms that characterize the suffering of the patient who is suffering from
impaired health state, while the term disease indicates the biological state of the body that
results in the suffering of the patient.47 Early in their disease, some patients with Amytrophic

44

Havi Carel, “Phenomenology and its application in medicine,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32, no 1
(2011): 33–46.
45
Ibid.
46
Fredrick Svenaeus, “The body uncanny—further steps towards a phenomenology of illness,” Medicine,
Health Care and Philosophy 3, no 2 (2000): 125–37.
47
Luís Madeira, et al., “The Uncanny of the Illness Experience: Can Phenomenology Help?” Psychopathology 52
(2019): 276.
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Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), which is a terminal disabling illness, report severe disability and
suffering due to their symptoms, and when I examine them clinically I find only a subtle
weakness that may involve a few fingers for example. This disability usually is not
appreciated by family of the patient; however, it may cause severe psychological stress and
make him suffer unbearably especially if this is his dominant hand (the hand which he uses in
nearly all his activities).
Thus, the experience of illness does not include only bodily changes that are caused
by the disease, but also the feeling of becoming ill. This encompasses changes in the
familiarity of the world of the ill person, a feeling of loss of control, changes in his
interaction with the surroundings, and if the disease is fatal, this brings certainty of death.
This non-scientific aspect of the disease is characterized by uncanny bodily experiences and
the experience of an unhomelike being-in-the-world.
The term uncanny was first used to describe the one who is not prudent or canny;
today, it is used to refer to a meaningful experience of phenomenon of restlessness lived with
fear.48 Uncanny is the English word for the German word unheimlich, but the translation of
this German word is challenging since, “Heim” means “home”, so the term could be
translated as “losing the feeling of being at home”.49 Shelling defined the term uncanny as the
sudden opening of things that “should have remained hidden, but which came to light.”50 The
term was introduced to psychology and psychiatry by Freud’s essay Das Unheimliche. In this
essay, Freud used the term uncanny as a form of anxiety that was provoked by strangeness
and ambiguity.51
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In Being and Time, Heidegger was questioning the meaning of being and the search
for it. He analyzed phenomenologically the being of human beings, Da-sein (being-there, as
being-in-the-world) which is the meaningful human presence in the world. Homelessness was
a recurrent theme in Heidegger’s work. According to Heidegger, this uncanniness (a form of
anxiety) emerges when the world becomes unfamiliar and strange and cannot be grasped.52
Uncanniness in Heidegger’s work refers to a state of anxiety that accompanies the awakening
to the finitude of life, and becomes a turning point in one’s life, and reflects the death of the
former Dasein with its limitless ontological possibilities. Uncanniness is the key aspect to
characterize the experience of becoming ill, as the changes in the body turn what was
intimate and familiar into something fragile, and the ill person becomes certain of the finitude
of life. I remember one of my patients who had reached a degree of disability that rendered
him wheelchair bound. He once told me in one of his follow-up visits that he feels that this
body does not belong to him, he feels as if he is imprisoned in this body or, as he put it, “this
cage.”
The uncanny has two aspects: one is the loss of familiarity of the person’s own body
and the surrounding world and the second is the subsequent new perception of one’s body,
which is now alien and is no longer one’s home, and of the world.53 Besides the uncanniness,
the experience of illness causes other ontological and social changes. Ontologically, the ill
person looks at his past as unrecognizable, and sees his future as being impossible. This is
called presentification.54 On the social level, the experience of becoming ill causes a social

52

Fredrick Svenaeus, “Das unheimliche—towards a phenomenology of illness,” Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy 3, no 1 (2000): 3–16.
53
Fredrick Svenaeus, “The body as alien, unhomelike, and uncanny: some further clarifications,” Philosophy,
Psychiatry and Psychology 20, no 1 (2013): 99–101.
54
Fredrick Svenaeus, “Illness as unhomelike being-in-the-world: Heidegger and the phenomenology of
medicine,” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 14, no 3 (2011): 333–43.

20

detachment, inability to perform social responsibilities, and a failure to fulfil goals assigned
by the society, which causes the subject to have an increased sense of alienation.55
Therefore, the concept of the uncanny is a central concept in the phenomenology of
illness as shown by Svenaeus,56 and this experience of uncanniness should be regarded as
part of the disease, and should be recognized and approached as such.
2.2 Phenomenology of suffering
Patients with serious diseases have priorities other than just prolonging their lives;
their priorities include eliminating suffering, strengthening their relationships with their
family members and friends, and avoiding being a burden on others.57 when of my patients
was diagnosed with ALS, all she cared about was the household responsibilities and who
would take care of her family when she reached the end stage of the disease.
Suffering is one of the key concepts in bioethics; in his book Phenomenological
Bioethics, Svenaeus discusses the phenomenology of suffering in medical practice. He
emphasizes that suffering is not only about physical pain, but it also involves the inability of
the person to engage in the world with others and to realize his core life values because of his
disability.58 Every person has his own life value, for example, a thumb disability could affect
the life values of a surgeon, but not for a teacher. One of my patients was a lawyer and was a
diagnosed with a certain type of ALS which affects speech and swallowing early in the
disease, then weakness spreads to involve his arms and legs. He was only concerned with his
speech problems, which will prevent him eventually from pleading before the court.
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Suffering can also be regarded as the inability to retain one’s self image and his image in the
eyes of others.
We have to take into consideration what dignity means to disabled patients, and how
they perceive the loss of freedom and suffering will affect their dignity. Serious illnesses with
severe disability creates increasing levels of suffering (physical and psychological) due to the
state of dependence, which may be undignified to many patients. Miles Bore noticed that
even when the patient has to undergo some medical procedures that are safe and have high
success rates and all records will be kept confidentially, he still feels a loss of dignity, as he
has to be exposed to strangers and this violates his privacy.59 Let me present some other
studies to discuss how patients perceive their disabling illness as affecting their dignity.
Although human dignity is independent of any other variable as affirmed by
personalists and contemporary philosophers, studies conducted on terminally ill patients
showed that not all patients share this conception; there is a small population of patients who
have different views about dignity and how it is compromised during the course of their
illness. In 2002, Chochinov and his colleagues recruited 213 terminally ill cancer patients
with life expectancy less than 6 months, and they asked them to rate their perceived sense of
dignity. 16 of their patients (7.5%) reported that they are concerned about the loss of their
dignity; these patients reported increased psychological suffering and increased dependence
on others, and they expressed loss of the will to survive.60 When Chochinov and his
colleagues (2006) revisited and validated the dignity model in a group of terminally ill
patients receiving palliative care, they aimed at specifying various factors that compromise
dignity. The main two factors that affect patients’ dignity according to this study are feeling
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that they are a burden to others (87.1%) and that they are not treated with proper respect
(87.1%).61 Gennip and his colleague (2013) conducted another study on a group of patients
with serious illnesses; they interviewed 34 patients with severe diseases as cancer and early
stage dementia to explore their disease experiences regarding their personal dignity. Authors
concluded that disease does not affect dignity directly, rather, it affects it indirectly through
affecting the way a patient perceives himself.62
Therefore, in accordance with my first claim that dignity is not violated by any other
external factor such as disability, it is shown that most of the patients do not perceive
disability as a threat to their dignity. However, some terminally ill patients suffer on the
psychological level because of the consequences of the uncanniness they feel. They link
dignity with their dependence and impaired social roles, which when lost, will result in loss
of their sense of dignity.
Although most of my patients did not report an impaired sense of dignity throughout
their illness, some, especially men, complained if they are dependent on their wives, sons, or
daughter, or in some cases, their daughters-in-law. For them this situation impairs their sense
of dignity. Another problem that is sometimes reported by some patients is the uncanniness
that was discussed in the previous section, with its ontological and social consequences.
However, when the patient is taught some techniques to be able to deal with his disability and
perform his social activity in a less dependent way, and when he is given proper
psychotherapy to accept his disability, he accepts his new bodily experience and regains his
sense of dignity.
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Still the problem of freedom is a concern for some patients. Some patients perceive
their disability as the cause of their loss of freedom, and consequently, feeling that this lack
of freedom compromises their dignity and perceived sense of respect. Accordingly, they lose
their will to live longer. This is not a new idea as it dignity was connected in some earlier
classical thoughts with freedom, as was discussed in the first chapter. This leads us to discuss
the concept of freedom from an existential and phenomenological point of views, and to
examine the hypothesis that disability could impair freedom in its existential sense.
2.3 Freedom
As shown in the previous chapter, some classical views rooted dignity in freedom,
and as shown in the previous section, some patient reported an impaired sense of dignity as a
result of increasing their dependency on others and the perceived lack of freedom. So, is
freedom lost throughout disabling illness? In this section, I intend to discuss the concept of
freedom as proposed by Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre, and whether human freedom
is really lost in the course of disabling illness. The concept of freedom in Heidegger’s works
is obscure and is not easily understood; that is why this point in Heidegger’s works is often
understood through the lens of Sartre. However, differences between their use of this concept
cannot be ignored; we find that Heidegger focuses on the inner freedom of the dynamic being
while Sartre extends this idea and connects this freedom of the individual subject to others.
2.3.1 Heidegger on freedom
One of the fundamental questions regarding Dasein is “the authenticity of its
existence”. In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses our existence in the terms of Dasein
(Being-in-the-world) which originally and for the most part exists in the world in an
inauthentic mode of what Heidegger calls everydayness. Inauthentic Dasein means that it
chooses to not choose itself and accepts norms and traditions and other values shared by
24

others in the community without being able to stand out of the crowd and be different.63
Dasein should strive to make its own self and become in its authentic mode (choosing to
choose itself), and this happens by entering a state of anxiety and a continuous search for
one’s true self (authenticity).64 This is similar to what happens during disabling illness;
individuals as assigned specific social roles which usually put them in inauthentic mode of
Dasein, and when they face disability, they are unable to perform these social roles, they
suffer from anxiety because they are detached from their usual self, and they have to find
their true self (authentic Dasein) away from social norms.
For Heidegger, authenticity refers to the ownership of one’s choices and being selfdetermined, and freedom in its existential sense is a condition for the dynamic being; he
maintained that “Dasein is itself in and from its own most peculiar possibility, a possibility
that has been seized on and chosen by the Dasein itself.”65 Accordingly, this means that
Dasein possesses potentiality. Therefore, in Being and Time, freedom can be understood in
relation to this authenticity, and Dasein, in order to live authentically and to overcome this
inauthenticity, has to free itself. Disability could be a chance to find the authentic Dasein.
Before Dasein becomes authentic, it must detach from the “they-self” to regain itself
and know its possibilities; this is accomplished by anxiety. As discussed earlier, human being
is thrown into the world as an inauthentic Dasein, and in order to attain its authenticity
Dasein should recognize its finitude (which happens during the course of illness) and all its
possibilities. This authentic existence is accompanied by anxiety. Anxiety is often regarded as
an experience of losing control and a state of powerlessness: this is the negative anxiety
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(fear). But Heidegger in “Being and Time” distinguishes between fear and anxiety (Angst);
fear is when there is an identifiable threat to life, but the anxiety of the Dasein is not the
negative anxiety. Rather, it is the productive anxiety that makes one recognize his selfhood,
freedom and potentialities. Anxiety is this case is an enlightening experience for Dasein,
which becomes aware of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and exists in an authentic
mode.66 Therefore, without this anxiety, Dasein can never attain its selfhood or freedom.
2.3.2 Sartre on freedom
When Sartre said that existence precedes essence, he meant “ that man first of all
exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards.”67 In
1946, Sartre gave a lecture titled “Existentialism is a Humanism” in which existentialism was
introduced and came to prominence, and in which his views about human beings and human
nature were crystallized. To Sartre, man is responsible for all his actions the moment he is
thrown into this world; that is why “Man is condemned to be free.68” He is “Condemned” as
he did not create himself; however, he is at liberty. This freedom gives one the ability to build
his own identity. “I donate money because I am generous.” The direct explanation of this act
is commonly found in my being generous (my identity); thus, we understand human actions
by looking to personal identities. But for Sartre, it is the other way round. It is the action that
establishes the personal identity. So instead of saying “I donate money because I am
generous”, one should instead say, “I am generous because I donate money”. Therefore,
human actions are not secondary to their identities; they are the foundations for this identity,

66

Ibid., 188 and 232.
Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2007), 1-11.
68
Ibid., 1-11.
67

26

and thus the center of what it is to be a human. Authenticity for Sartre is to live a free life
with the ability to have free choice, and free man should be responsible for his actions.
According to Sartre, existence comes prior to essence, freedom is absolute, and
existence is freedom. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre makes a distinction between two
types of freedom: “Freedom to obtain” and “Freedom to choose”. The former “freedom to
obtain” means the freedom to obtain what one wishes which refers to one’s ability to act in a
certain way in the sensible world. The latter, “freedom to choose,” refers to the freedom “by
oneself to determine oneself to wish,” or “the autonomy of choice” (philosophical concept);
this latter type of freedom refers to the fundamental projects in life that one sets for himself
and the meaning he gives to situations in which he finds himself; he can perceive his
disability as being humiliating or “an object of pride.”6970 Although both types of freedom are
interrelated, Sartre emphasized the distinction between the two terms; “my freedom to choose
must not be confused with my freedom to obtain.” Absolute freedom is referred only to
“freedom to choose” and not “freedom to obtain” in which freedom is limited by
situatedness. For a person without legs and is not free to walk, freedom to obtain is hindered
but he still has the freedom to choose how he wants himself to be crippled or not crippled;
freedom to choose is absolute. Another example is the slave and master; although the slave
does not have equal freedom to obtain wealth as his master because he is enslaved, he has
equal freedom to choose as his master.71
Sartre’s view about freedom is subjected to criticism and misunderstanding because it
is impossible to achieve total freedom; choices can never be unlimited because even in the
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presence of choices, there are limited choices to choose between. Therefore, Sartre’s doctrine
of freedom was regarded by some scholars as self-contradictory, arguing that there is no
absolute freedom; salves and patients with physical disability do not possess freedom. On the
other hand, having made the distinction between the absolute freedom to choose and
autonomy of choice (ontological freedom) and the freedom to obtain (existential freedom)
can relieve the tension and make Sartre’s views more compatible.72 It is correct that freedom
to obtain is not always realized; however, the freedom to choose cannot be taken from the
individual even if he has a physical disability. He still possesses the freedom to choose how
to react to his disability and how to uncover new opportunities.
2.4 Chapter discussion
In this chapter, I presented how uncanniness affects the ill person on the ontological
and social levels, which leads to suffering not only on the physical level, but also on the
psychological level. From the studies I presented, most patients did not report an impaired
sense of dignity throughout the course of their illness, which supports my claim that dignity is
independent of any other quality. However, only a small population of patients reported
increased suffering because of their disability and lack of freedom, and this would impair
their sense of dignity. This would bring to us what I presented in the first chapter, insofar as
that some of classical thought had grounded dignity on freedom. So the question came next,
do patients with disability really lack freedom? I presented arguments about freedom from
phenomenological and existential standpoint to support or refute this opinion. From what I
presented, I argued that freedom exists throughout disabling illness; it is not lost because of
disability; therefore, patients still possess their dignity. Therefore, even if we argued that
dignity is rooted in freedom, disabled patients would still possess their freedom to choose. On
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the other hand, conforming to assigned social roles put the Dasein in an inauthentic mode, so
perhaps disability and inability to perform social roles is a chance to find the authentic
Dasein.
In the third chapter, I will discuss the moral permissibility of euthanasia in relation to
human dignity. Although classical and some contemporary views did not directly address
euthanasia, they discussed it in an indirect way through the discussion of suicide. I will
present classical and contemporary views about suicide, and how the evolution of the concept
of dignity is aligned with the evolution of ethical debate concerning suicide. Then, I will
present some contemporary views about voluntary euthanasia.
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Chapter 3: Moral debates over voluntary euthanasia
3.1 Classical views about suicide
3.1.1 Plato and Aristotle
Plato discussed suicide in two of his works: Phaedo and Laws. In Phaedo, Socrates
said that committing suicide is wrong because we release ourselves (souls) from bodies that
the gods placed us in.73 Then in Laws, Plato mentioned that this act is disgraceful, and those
who commit it should be buried in unmarked graves; however, Plato presented four
exceptions: (1) if the mind is morally corrupted and the character cannot be salvaged,74 (2) if
this act is commanded by judicial order, as what happened to Socrates, (3) if this act is
compelled by unavoidable personal misfortune, and (4) if this act happens due to shame for
participating in unjust actions.75 In the Republic, he touched upon this issue when Socrates
stated that patients who are unable to live a normal life and are not useful to themselves or the
society because of their suffering, should not be given treatments for life prolongation;76 this
view can be interpreted as an indirect way for approving passive euthanasia as long as the
person has lost his social worthiness. In Nicomachean Ethics, and in the discussion of how
one can treat himself unjustly, Aristotle condemned suicide for two reasons: first, he morally
disapproved of suicide as being an act of cowardice, and secondly, he saw suicide as being an
act of injustice to the society (similar to desertion from the army.)77
It is noted that both Plato (in Laws and Republic) and Aristotle based their views on
suicide mainly on the social role of the individual and his/her benefit to the society, rather
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than on individual inner worth. Therefore, as dignity was based on social status and
worthiness in this period, suicide was rejected also for the sake of the society.
3.1.2 Stoics
On the other hand, the Stoics maintained that, regardless of the virtue of the person, in
case it was not possible to live a flourishing life, suicide might be justified. In order for the
person to be happy and to live a flourishing life, he should possess certain natural advantages
such as physical heath, and whenever a wise person realizes that he lacks these qualities,
ending his life would neither enhance nor undermines his moral virtues.78 It is not just
quantity, but also the quality of life that matters, as suggested by Seneca.
This view about suicide is aligned with their conception of dignity, that it is not
dependent on social status, as mentioned in the first chapter. Both thoughts about dignity and
suicide revolve around the reason of the person being the root of his dignity and according to
which, judgements about the quality of a life could be made.
3.1.3 Medieval thinkers
Christian doctrine held that suicide is a morally wrong act. St. Augustine described
suicide as an unrepentable sin, and he was the first who offered the justification of
prohibition, being a natural extension of the 5th commandment.79 80 Later, St. Thomas
Aquinas defended the prohibition of suicide for three main reasons: as being contrary to our
natural act of self-love whose aim is to preserve our lives, as harming the society of the
person in question; and lastly, since life is given to us by God and He is the only one who has
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the right to determine the duration of our earthly stay, as violation of one’s duty to God.81
Therefore, we can infer that suicide, being a major sin, deprives a person from his dignity, as
was suggested by medieval thinkers in the first chapter.
3.1.4 Modernity
The thinkers of Modernity generally agreed with the Church’s prohibition of suicide.
John Locke, in the late seventeenth century, echoed Aquinas’ arguments and affirmed that
although God granted us natural liberty, this liberty does not include suicide.82 Yet, in the
eighteenth century, there were increasing attacks on Aquinas’s position.
John Donne
The first clear defence of suicide was that of John Donne’s Biathanatos. He argued
that Christian doctrine should not forbid suicide and should not hold that it is sinful for three
main reasons. It is not against the laws of nature. If it contradicted laws of nature that
mandate self-preservation, then all other acts of self-denial should be also sinful. It is not
against reason, as there are some cases in which reason favours suicide. It is not against God;
as there is no clear scripture condemning suicide.83 Therefore, suicide according to his
argument is not a major sin, and consequently, does not deprive a person from his dignity as
was argued.
David Hume
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Again, David Hume explicitly attacked Aquinas’ position in Of Suicide; he regarded
traditional attitudes as being rooted in misunderstandings of God’s relation to humanity.84
Hume distinguished between two kinds of laws: laws by which individuals govern
themselves and laws by which God governs nature. God has granted individuals the power to
pursue their own happiness and escape a bad life; therefore, an individual does not commit a
sinful act by exercising his will. Hume’s argument was grounded on the following: if suicide
violated God’s law, then it would be sinful to disturb these laws in some circumstances to
achieve personal happiness, but God sometimes permits us to disturb his orders as he does
not expect us to surrender to illnesses. The second claim is that if adherence to God’s orders
will grant us happiness as indicated by reason, then suicide could be seen as conforming to
these laws when it is rational to achieve happiness by dying. The final claim is that if by
Divine order we mean these events that happen according to God’s consent, and since God
can intervene in all our actions at any given point, then God seems to approve all our actions.
Beside his position against Aquinas’ argument, Hume did not oppose suicide for other
reasons. He rejected the thesis that suicide violates our duty towards others; reciprocity
means to exchange benefits with the society, but if by living one provides only frivolous
advantage to his society at the expense of his suffering, and moreover, one can be a burden to
others, then this reciprocity ceases to happen. Also, Hume rejected the idea that suicide
violates duty to oneself. Illness and misfortune could lead to a miserable life that is worse
than death. And in response to the fear that persons might commit suicide capriciously, Hume
argued that the natural fear of death embedded in ourselves would ensure that committing
suicide would happen only after careful assessment of our lives and with sufficient courage.
Hume’s position is utilitarian in a great sense and aligned with his perspective about personal
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liberty. The concept of duty leads us to Kant’s moral theory and how Kant discussed suicide
in relation to dignity and morality.
Kantian moral theory
Immanuel Kant was the most noteworthy opponent of suicide in Modernity. Kant’s
position reflected his views on the moral worth of all individuals rooted in their rational and
autonomous agency, and that suicide is a direct attack on the source of this moral authority.85
Rational will is root of the moral duty, and therefore it is a contradiction to assume that this
will would allow the destruction of the body that executes its volitions.
Self-respect as a moral duty
Self-respect is an important subject in moral philosophy, and it has great importance
in our everyday life. Its value may be taken for granted until we face a situation in which it is
threatened or shaken. In the eighteenth century, Kant focused on Respect and self-respect in
his moral philosophy and revolutionized these concepts. In The Groundwork, Kant identified
certain moral duties to oneself (such as not to commit suicide) which is derived from our
dignity and our duty to respect humanity. He considered the duty of self-respect as the most
fundamental moral duty, and fulfilling this duty is a necessary condition to fulfilling our duty
to respect others. Self-respect is a moral relation of a person to himself that reflects his
intrinsic worth. Kant argued that one is always aware of his dignity as a person and of his
moral obligation for self-respect, and this awareness is identified as a feeling of reverential
respect for oneself. Self-respect is the motivation to do morally good deeds and be a moral
person.
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Kant focused on dignity based recognition of self-respect, and for him, all persons are
morally entitled to have this type of self-respect. There are three kinds of such self-respect;
the first is the respect for oneself as being a member of the moral community, having dignity
as all other members, and having moral rights that others ought not to violate. The second
kind comes from the appreciation of oneself being responsible for living in accordance with
his dignity as a person, and the last involves the importance of acting autonomously by
defining one’s own life.86
3.1.5 Post Kantian views and response to moral arguments about suicide
The debate about suicide continued in post-Kantian German philosophy.
Schopenhauer, like Hume, rejected all moral arguments that oppose suicide; However, his
pessimistic philosophical views still led him to reject suicide. Schopenhauer argued that
freedom could be achieved from suffering through denying one’s will-to-life. According to
Schopenhauer, the desire to kill oneself and to end one’s life comes from the will’s pursuit of
desires, and instead of denying these desires, suicide as an act of the will affirms this striving
and confirms the will-to-life.87 Nietzsche also rejected moral arguments on suicide, but in
contrast to Schopenhauer, he believed that in some circumstances suicide asserts one’s will
and it might give a meaning to one’s life in a meaningless world.88
3.2 Contemporary views about suicide
3.2.1 Existentialism - Albert Camus
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For existentialists, suicide was not discussed in relation to moral considerations,
rather, it was analysed in relation to absurdity.89 In The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus
wrote that there are so many causes for suicide; however, “the most obvious ones were not
the most powerful.”90 Camus went on to describe his thoughts about suicide and consider this
act as “confessing that life is too much for you or that you do not understand it…It is merely
confessing that it ‘is not worth the trouble’.”91
In his work, Camus focused on the relation between suicide and the absurd, and to
what degree suicide can be understood as a solution to absurdism.92 The absurd, for Camus, is
the conflict between the desire for life to be meaningful and the realization that this cannot be
achieved.93 The absurd arises as a result of the confrontation between the person and the
world.94 As Camus put it, the absurd “is that divorce between the mind that desires and the
world that disappoints.”95 When a person decides to commit suicide, he is declaring that the
value of his existence becomes questionable and life “is not worth living.”96 However, not
everyone responds to absurdity by adopting this nihilistic conclusion about life and its worth.
For Camus, committing suicide is rejecting freedom; He believed that escaping from the
absurdity of reality to death is not the answer; rather, one should embrace his life
passionately. This is the existential revolt which is the constant confrontation between the
person and his own obscurity.
3.3 Debates over voluntary euthanasia
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Voluntary euthanasia has been a fruitful topic for moral debate since the second half
of the 20th century. It is often discussed with respect to the individual’s autonomous choice
and his wellbeing. In this section, I will present two arguments in favour of euthanasia; the
first is a critique of Kant’s position, and the second is Peter Singer’s assumption that some
lives might be worse than others.
3.3.1 Critique of Kant’s position
As I showed in the first chapter, Kant perceived dignity as the unconditional and
innate worth of human beings in the virtue of their rational agency. Therefore, the lives of
rational beings should be respected in all circumstances. In The Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant presented his argument about suicide and measured it against
the categorical imperatives.97 According to Kant’s categorical imperatives, killing oneself to
avoid a painful life is wrong and immoral for rational beings because it violates the moral law
and undermines personhood. Kant opposed suicide as it contradicts the feeling of self-love
which serves to preserve life; this moral duty holds unexceptionally to all rational human
beings (moral agents).98
From this argument, one might infer that, since killing oneself is morally wrong,
therefore, voluntary euthanasia is also morally wrong.99 However, this Kantian concept has
been subjected to a range of interpretations and criticism.100 Most objections focus on the fact
that the Kantian notion of dignity that it is linked to rationality and moral agency, as
discussed earlier. Some authors argued that the Kantian approach justifies suicide for patients
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with severe dementia, as the patient in such cases lacks rationality and ceases to be a moral
agent; dementia transforms the active autonomous and moral agent into a passive non-moral
agent.101 Some authors even emphasize that euthanasia is morally accepted and suicide is
supported by the Kantian moral law in cases of severe dementia and loss of rationality.
According to Cooley, the highest level of selfhood is the moral self, and this level is
essential for the worth and dignity of human beings. This moral self and therefore human
dignity are lost in dementia. Cooley in his paper argues that a patient with dementia has the
duty to die to preserve his dignity and autonomy that would be lost if he loses his rational
capabilities throughout the course of dementia.102 Cooley builds his argument on an analogy;
he presents Kant’s example of the madman who threatens others and imposes danger on them
because he does not have autonomy to act as a moral agent. In this case, Kant suggests that
this madman instead of facing a loss of personhood, should take his own life. Cooley, by
analogy, suggests that Kant would have said the same about a person facing dementia; he
concludes that a ‘moral agent should select self-inflicted death before she becomes
incompetent because she owes it to herself as a moral agent”103. Cooley’s position was
further explained by Rhodes who clarifies that human dignity and moral agency are not
“preserved” by suicide, because the person ceases to exist after death; rather, the person
avoids becoming a “non-person” by suicide.104
This might raise a question of what it means to be a non-person; does the person lose
his personhood when he loses his rationality? As clarified in the first chapter, I would argue
that personhood is not lost under any condition; therefore, one does not cease to be a person
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if he loses his rationality. On the other hand, Robert Sharp, although he does not discuss the
hypothesis of becoming a non-person, criticized Cooley’s argument and wondered how
terrible becoming a non-person is that suicide becomes a better alternative.105 Cooley’s
argument, which is based on analogy, might be also criticized because dementia cannot
always be compared to madness; there are types of dementia in which the patient does not
impose danger on others.106 Also, in the era of introducing new medical technologies and
neuroscience advancement, and some neurodegenerative disorders -some cases of motor
neuron disease for example- have become curable nowadays. Thus, there are increasing
chances that dementia, as one of the neurodegenerative disorders, may be curable in the near
future, such that euthanasia may take away the chance for the patient to be cured. Also, most
of the neurodegenerative disorders, occur on a wide spectrum, and the severity of the disease
varies from one patient to another, which makes the course of the disease unpredictable in
some cases.
3.3.2 Peter Singer: Sanctity of life vs quality of life
Peter Singer, an influential utilitarian bioethicist, replaced the “sanctity of life” with
the “quality of life” ethics, and argued that the “ethical outlook that holds that human life to
be sacrosanct – I shall call it the ‘sanctity-of-life view’ – is under attack.”107 This leads him to
claim that the worth of human life varies,108 and that killing human beings is morally justified
in some circumstances.109 The principle of the sanctity of life, which maintains that human
life possesses an intrinsic dignity, holds that one must not intentionally kill any other human
being regardless of their ability or inability (the right to life).110 The physician who
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intentionally ends his patient’s life whatever the motive, whether injecting lethal poison or by
withholding life support measures, breaches this principle.111 On the other hand, the quality
of life ethical view maintains that lives of certain patients may fall below a certain quality
threshold because of an illness or disability, which supports the claim that some lives are not
worth living.; therefore death might be of benefit to the individual him/herself.112
Singer’s argument for variation in human lives’ worth is presented with reference to
malformed babies. In his article originally published in 1991, Singer argued that some lives
are worse than others; therefore, it is morally right to kill persons with bad lives.113 His book
Writings on an Ethical Life is a collection of his most influential articles in the field of
practical ethics such as on abortion and euthanasia. He presents two fundamental ethical
concepts: unnecessary pain should not be inflicted upon any living being, and self-awareness
is the defining characteristic of a person. Singer sees that it is ethically right to kill severely
disabled neonates as they are not self-aware, but this killing should be painless (lethal
injections), and not through withdrawal of care which may increase suffering of the person,
and that is not humane.
Opponents of Singer refuse to judge lives of severely disabled children as worse than
others, and therefore refuse to avoid having those children. Singer’s argument comes from an
analogy by which he responds to his opponents; Singer gives an example of man with a
broken leg. According to his opponents, this broken leg should not be mended because in
doing so, we judge this man’s life to be less worthy than other lives. Based on this analogy,
Singer approved abortion of malformed fetuses after prenatal diagnosis of severe disability.
He went on in his argument and enjoined his opponents to give up medical and surgical
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measures that improve the lives of patients (as they do not agree on his notion that some lives
are less worthy than others; therefore, they do not have an obligation to improve patients’
lives), or to accept and support euthanasia.
However, his argument was controversial and has been subjected to criticism. First of
all, the term “life worth living” is not fully understood; I agree that life with a mended leg is
better than that with a broken one, but is “better life” synonymous with a “life worth living”?
When we judge someone’s life as being better or worse than another life, we do not associate
this with worthiness of the life, which depends on many factors, not just one. Also, Singer’s
argument is based on an analogy in which there are two parts compared to each other, and
consequently one of them is clarified. These two parts should share major crucial aspects, and
areas of dissimilarities should be minor. Circling back to his argument, we find that Singer
concluded that euthanasia is the same as mending a broken leg by comparing two different
situations, in which there are major areas of dissimilarities.
A central objection to Singer’s position is that it violates the intrinsic value of each
individual and makes him subject to discriminatory judgements based on certain physical or
mental criteria to determine whether his life is worthy. In response to Singer’s position,
Crosby maintained that human beings should be treated as irreplaceable, and this
irreplaceability should be derived from the fact that we are persons, and consequently, I
should not kill anyone, as I do not want to be killed.114 Therefore, suicide is regarded as being
a violation of a person’s moral duty to respect and value his own life. It is also unclear which
disability and which degree of disability hold a low quality of life; this raises other objection
that sometimes patients are in error about the present and future worthiness of their lives.115
Therefore, quality of life is neither a reliable nor objective tool to judge one’s life.
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3.3 Chapter discussion
Aligned with the evolution of the concept of dignity (that was first tied to social
worth, freedom and reason, and then became recognized as an inherent value of all human
beings), moral debate over suicide and euthanasia has undergone similar changes. And with
increased appreciation for the intrinsic worth of human life, suicide was thought to interfere
with human inner worth because human life is inherently valuable and should be respected.
Since Plato and Aristotle, suicide was viewed as being wrong because it interferes with the
social role of the individual. Then, medieval thinkers declared that suicide is a major sin
(which consequently deprives the person of his dignity since dignity is violated by
committing sins, as was discussed before). Responding to these religious considerations,
modern thinkers such as Donne and Hume declared that suicide is not a major sin, which
means that in their views it does not violate dignity.
Kant explicitly opposed suicide; he argued that human life is intrinsically valuable
and the rational human being should never be treated as a means to an end, but as an end in
itself.116 Again, Kant’s position was critiqued especially in cases of disease in which someone
may lose his rationality, such as in dementia. However, this critique was also subjected to
various objections, especially in the era of new technologies and neuroscientific
advancement, where what is incurable today, may be curable tomorrow; also, the spectrum of
neurodegenerative disorders is wide, and symptoms severity differs from one patient to
another, which makes the course of the disease highly unpredictable in some cases.
In his argument advocating euthanasia, Peter Singer argued that the value of life is not
measured by the sanctity of life, but rather by the quality of life; therefore, suicide might be
allowed if the quality of life is expected to be low because of a disability or a disease. It is
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also argued that suicide might affirm the value of a human life when there is a medical illness
that reduces the person to a shadow of his former healthy self. In his response to Singer’s
argument, Crosby maintained that human beings should be treated as irreplaceable, and this
irreplaceability should be derived from the fact that we are persons, and consequently, I
should not kill anyone, as I do not want to be killed.117 Therefore, suicide is regarded as being
a violation of the moral duty to respect and value one’s own life. Objections also arise
concerning the arbitrariness of physical and mental criteria that would deem life unworthy.
All these objections would deem the quality of life ethical view unreliable tool to judge one’s
life worthiness.
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4. Conclusion
Human dignity is a term that seems clear at first sight, but when we look closely, we
find that it is interpreted differently by various philosophers. Dignity is claimed to be an
aggregation of valuable values and qualities, and to respect dignity means to accept these
values and qualities that are believed to have value or worth. Another claim is that dignity
comes from these values and qualities that are reflected in one’s behaviour. The question then
arises about the nature of these values and qualities that constitute dignity. Some philosophers
simply regard dignity as something ontologically given and that all persons are born with it;
others claim that the essence of human dignity consists in the values and qualities that are
possessed only by the moral agent; and still others regard dignity as tied to a specific social
minimum of rights. The concept of human dignity is brought up when patients with terminal
illness, especially illnesses with severe disability, undergo treatment for prolonging their lives
or face decisions about euthanasia.
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate different philosophical views about the concept
of dignity, and how the evolution of this concept throughout history affected our
understanding of the moral permissibility of euthanasia. I proposed two main arguments: the
first is that human dignity is a foundational value which explains other ethical concepts; it is
an inherent feature of all human beings, and it is not dependent on other qualities. To proceed
in this argument, I presented the evolution of the concept and how it changed throughout
history from being tied to other qualities such as social status (as in ancient Greece), reason
(Stoics and Kant), and freedom (Italian humanism), to become an inherent feature of all
human beings (contemporary views as argued by personalism and phenomenology). This
contemporary understanding of human dignity has overcome a centuries old history of
reference to other qualities or values as being the root of human dignity. This evolution is
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aligned with increased worthiness of the person, which become evident in the twentieth
century.
Since dignity is an intrinsic feature of all persons that cannot be lost under any
circumstance, it is concluded that disability does not deprive patients of their dignity.
However, illness is a unique experience that should be understood from the first person
position. In the second chapter I presented the phenomenology of illness and suffering. I
presented examples of real patients whom I encountered during my practice, and presented
some studies in order to know how patients perceive their dignity in relation to their
disability. In this chapter, I discussed how the experience of the uncanny affects patients on
the ontological and social levels, in such a way as to alter his self-image and interfere with his
social role. Then I presented opinions of some patients regarding how they perceive their
suffering on both the physical and psychological levels, in terms of affecting their sense of
dignity. In accordance with my conclusion from the first chapter, most patients did not
perceive a loss or violation of their dignity because of their disability; however, a small
population of patients reported their disability negatively impacted their sense of freedom.
Some of my patients who reported a loss of dignity changed their opinion after lifestyle
modification were made to accommodate their disability, in a way that made them less
dependent on others. Others reported that the cause of their impaired sense of dignity came
from their dependence on others and the lack of freedom that cannot be dealt with even after
lifestyle modification. Since freedom was connected previously with dignity by some
classical thinkers, and also, this connection was made by some patients, I decided to discuss
freedom from a phenomenological and existential perspectives and discuss whether it is lost
by physical disability. Freedom in its existential sense is not lost during disability, I
concluded; although patients may lack the freedom to obtain. He still possesses his freedom
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to change. Also, disability might be a chance for the person to find his authentic self that is
not shaped by social norms.
Moral discussion about the permissibility of suicide dates back to ancient Greece, and
it will remain an issue of debate on ethical, social, religious, and legal levels. One of the main
reasons for opposing euthanasia is the fear that legalizing it may open the door for active nonvoluntary euthanasia for patients refusing suicide. In this section, I will focus on the ethical
discussion of voluntary euthanasia in relation to human dignity. My second argument in this
thesis is that voluntary euthanasia violates human dignity. In the third chapter, I discussed
classical and contemporary views about suicide, then I presented some contemporary views
about euthanasia which were introduced as a hot topic for philosophical debate in the second
half of the twentieth century. Along with the evolution of the concept of human dignity and
increased recognition of human worth, ethical debate over suicide changed from being a
wrong act as regards society (for Plato and Aristotle) to being a violation of human dignity as
something that should be respected purely on its own terms. Medieval thinkers argued that
suicide is a major sin that deprives one of his dignity, but these views were rejected by
modern thinkers. Kant argued that the person should never be treated as a mean to an end
(formulation of CI); however, since CI is based on rationality, Kant’s position was subjected
to different interpretations and critical responses, especially in cases of dementia in which the
patient is subjected to loss of his rationality. This critique was also in turn subjected to
various objections. New therapies are evolving, and what is incurable today may be curable
tomorrow. Also, the spectrum of dementia or other degenerative disorders is wide, and
symptoms are not exactly the same in every patient, so it is sometimes not easy to predict the
course of the disease or the magnitude of the disability.
Respect for human life’s inviolability has been challenged over the past decades with
increasing claims with lives which pass a certain quality thresholds deserving protection.
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Peter Singer, as an advocate of euthanasia, has argued that the value of life is measured by
the quality of life instead of the sanctity of life; therefore, suicide might be allowed in cases
of low quality of life. It has also been argued that suicide might affirm the value of a human’s
life when there is a medical illness that reduces the person to shadows of his former healthy
self. Crosby responded to Singer’s argument by affirming that all persons are irreplaceable, I
should not kill anyone, as I do not want to be killed; therefore, suicide is a violation of the
value of human’ life.
To conclude, I have argued that human dignity is not tied to the person’s social or
economic contribution in his society; all persons, regardless of their different levels of
abilities, should be respected and treated in a dignified way because they are persons.
Therefore, the dignity of disabled patients should not be lost even if they do not actively
contribute to the economic well-being of their societies. I argue also that euthanasia violates
human dignity and is a declaration that an individual’s life is not valuable; it also takes away
the chance from patients to receive appropriate therapy
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